About Iran Block

OONI runs censorship measurement tests from volunteer probes inside Iran. Their data shows which services produce network anomalies when accessed from within the country.

The Tor Project publishes daily usage statistics by country, including estimates for how many users in Iran connect via bridges and relays.

Cloudflare Radar tracks traffic patterns, protocol adoption, and network quality across Cloudflare's global CDN. Iran country data includes traffic trends and internet quality scores. Its speed-test data gives download, upload and latency per Iranian network.

Google’s Transparency Report publishes, every half hour since 2009, Iran’s share of worldwide requests to each Google product. Reading Search, Gmail, Maps, Translate and YouTube side by side separates a shutdown (all of them fall) from a whitelist (Search comes back, the rest do not).

RIPEstat provides BGP routing data for Iranian ISPs — tracking which IP prefixes are announced globally, how many peers see them, and when routes are withdrawn.

RIPE Atlas is a global network of hardware probes. For each Iranian network and day we store the packet loss and round-trip time from Atlas probes inside Iran to the DNS root servers, read every 6 hours.

IODA combines BGP data, active TCP probing, and network telescope signals to detect internet outages in near real-time, with per-country and per-ISP granularity.

ArvanCloud Radar measures per-ISP reachability from 17 Iranian and international vantage points (8 inside Iran, 9 abroad) to 8 destination services (Google, GitHub, Wikipedia, Bing, PlayStation, Aparat, Divar, Digikala) at 1-minute resolution. Data is sourced directly from their public monitoring API.

Censored Planet (University of Michigan) measures censorship remotely, from servers inside each country rather than from users. We store the per-domain outcomes its observatory publishes for Iran — HTTPS, HTTP and DNS, from a handful of Iranian networks, roughly twice a week. Counts are probes, not people.

The Internet Health Report (IIJ Research Lab) measures AS hegemony — which transit networks carry each ASN's traffic. High hegemony on a single transit AS identifies a chokepoint that could disrupt large portions of Iran's internet. REST API, updated daily.

APNIC Labs estimates the number of internet users per ASN using ad measurement data and routing information. This gives a proxy for Iranian ISP market share, allowing per-ISP metrics to be weighted by actual user population rather than treating all ISPs equally.

ISOC Pulse (Internet Society) provides a composite internet resilience score and tracks connectivity loss events (net_loss) and estimated economic impact of shutdowns. Data includes infrastructure, traffic, routing, and security sub-scores for Iran.

bgp.tools publishes a snapshot of the global BGP routing table. Every 6 hours we read the number of prefixes each Iranian network announces, a check on RIPEstat's routing data.

IranBlock brings together signals from independent public measurement networks — censorship tests, routing observations, traffic trends, outage detectors, and connectivity probes — into a single view of Iran's internet. Each source refreshes on its own cadence, from near-real-time to daily, so the dashboard reflects both live conditions and longer trends.

Different sources answer different questions. Volunteer-run probes inside Iran capture what users experience on the ground. External reachability checks show whether services respond from outside the country. Global routing and telescope data reveal backbone-level changes that may not be visible to a single end user.

Charts and scores on this site combine these layers — anomalies, reachability, routing, and speed — so patterns are easier to compare across ISPs and services. BGP visibility in particular can look healthy during a shutdown because route announcements may continue even when traffic is blocked at the edge.